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Abstract
Research on religion as it relates to free will suggests that one’s religiosity and religious
commitment may have an impact on their beliefs about free will and determinism. Previous
research indicates a positive correlation between religiosity and belief in free will. When it
comes to determinism, reported results are more complicated but lightly suggest that there is a
negative correlation between religiosity and determinism--although different definitions of
determinism impact the correlation (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). The present study, involving 170
college students, investigated how religiosity and levels of religious commitment may impact
beliefs about free will and determinism. In addition, we found interesting results relating to
more complex and nuanced beliefs about free will and determinism, namely libertarianism.
Similar to previous research, we found that people who are religious have higher endorsement
of free will than those who are not religious. However, contrary to past research, we found that
those who are religious also have higher endorsement of determinism than those who are not
religious. In line with our reported results that religious people have higher endorsement of
determinism than non-religious people, we also found that those who are religious have lower
endorsement of libertarianism than those who are not religious. It is proposed, based on these
results, that those who are religious may interpret causal determinism as a type of divine
determinism, also known as fatalism; and therefore, religious people tend to believe that the
future is determined and caused by God’s will (Vicens, 2012).

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS THEY RELATE TO BELIEFS ABOUT FREE WILL

4

Religious Beliefs as They Relate to Beliefs about Free Will, Including Determinism,
Libertarianism, and Compatibilism
Free will has been a topic of contention for decades, but in general, this has been a
discussion largely dominated by the philosophical community. In recent years, however,
psychologists have begun to enter this conversation (Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada,
& Ross, 2014). The philosophical debate consists of how to define free will as well as
questioning whether or not free will is compatible with determinism. Psychologists, on the
other hand, are more focused on people’s beliefs about free will; they examine the psychology
of believing in free will in order to gain insight into the impacts believing in or not believing in
free will can have on people’s behaviors. Before discussing this psychological perspective on
free will, it is crucial to define free will, determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism.
Philosophers continue to debate the definition of free will, but for the present study, we
define free will as the ability of people to exercise the sense of control over their actions
necessary for moral responsibility, where moral responsibility is a person’s responsibility for
actions related to morality, or what is right and wrong (McKenna & Pereboom, 2016). As
previously stated, when people think about free will, they also consider the topic of
determinism. Determinism is the idea that at any time, there is only one possible future; it is
the theory that every event is determined by a previous event (McKenna & Pereboom, 2016).
In folk language, people often consider free will and determinism to be incompatible in
that it is not possible for both to be true. This understanding of or belief about free will relates
to the idea of libertarianism, which is the belief that humans are able to act freely and that
these actions are not determined by external factors (McKenna & Pereboom, 2016). However,

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS THEY RELATE TO BELIEFS ABOUT FREE WILL

5

in the field of philosophy, this is not universally accepted. On the contrary, many philosophers
accept the concept of compatibilism, or the idea that it is possible for determinism to be true
and for some person to have free will (McKenna & Pereboom, 2016).
Regarding research on free will in the discipline of psychology, an abundance of
researchers examine how people’s beliefs about free will influence their prosocial or helping
behaviors. For instance, Vohs and Schooler (2008) found that weaker endorsement of free will
led to an increase in cheating on tasks. Similarly, Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall (2009)
found that when people have been induced not to believe in free will, they exhibit more
aggressive behaviors and are less likely to help. However, recent research on the impact of
believing in free will on helping behaviors has also resulted in null findings (Harms, Liket,
Protzco, & Schölmerich, 2017; Crone & Levy, 2019). Although there is conflicting research on
whether free will beliefs increase helping behaviors, because these beliefs do appear to have
some impact on behavior in general, it might be helpful to examine factors that may contribute
to or be associated with people’s beliefs about free will.
One such factor that might influence free will beliefs is religion. Many religious teachings
endorse either free will or determinism. For instance, Martin Luther, in Bondage of the Will
(1823) states, “it stands confirmed, even by your own testimony, that we do all things from
necessity, not from Free-will: seeing that the power of Free-will is nothing . . .”. Therefore,
Luther’s teachings suggest that free will does not exist. In addition, Calvinists are taught that
God determines each person’s fate (Nadler, 2019). The idea that God determines people’s
actions (or destinies) is divine determinism or fatalism: every event is determined by God
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(Vicens, 2012). However, in Jewish teachings, there is no determinism. Rather, humans are
understood to have free will (Nadler, 2019).
Because there is such diversity in religious teachings on free will, one might question
how one’s self identified religious beliefs and commitment more generally relate to their beliefs
about free will. Previous research has briefly explored general relationships between religion
and free will. For instance, Nadelhoffer et al. (2014) found a significant positive correlation
between religiosity and agreement with a conditional account of free will utilizing their Free
Will Inventory. However, Murray, Murray, & Nadelhoffer (2020) found that the relationship
between Christianity and libertarian views of free will is not straightforward. Therefore, there is
a need for more research that explores these relationships.
Utilizing the Free Will Inventory (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014), the present study seeks to
further examine associations between religious beliefs, religious commitment, and beliefs
about free will, determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. This study tests the following
hypotheses: (1) People who are religious are more likely to have stronger free will beliefs than
those who do not affiliate with a religion; (1.1) People who self-identify as having strong
religious commitment are more likely to have stronger free will beliefs than those who selfidentify as having weaker religious commitment; (2) People who are religious are more likely to
have weaker beliefs in determinism than those who are not religious; (2.1) People who selfidentify as having strong religious commitment are more likely to have weaker beliefs in
determinism than those who self-identify as having weaker religious commitment; (3) People
are religious are more likely to endorse libertarianism than those who have no religious
affiliation; (3.1) People who self-identify as having strong religious commitment are more likely
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to endorse libertarianism than those who self-identify as having weaker religious commitment;
(4) People who are religious are less likely to endorse compatibilism than those who do not
affiliate with a religion; and (4.1) People who self-identify as having strong religious
commitment are less likely to endorse compatibilism than those who self-identify as having
weaker religious commitment;.

Methods
Participants
Participants were 170 Loyola Marymount University (LMU) undergraduate students
recruited online through LMU Psychology Department’s Human Subject Pool. 24.7% of
participants (n = 43) reported being male, 72.4% of participants (n = 126) reported being
female, and 0.6% of participants (n = 1) reported other. 20.7% of participants (n = 36) reported
being Asian or Asian American; 9.8% of participants (n = 17) reported being Black or African
American; 9.2% of participants (n = 16) reported being Hispanic or Latinx; 0.6% of participants
(n = 1) reported being Native American, or Pacific Islander, or Alaskan Native; 54% of
participants (n = 94) reported being White or European American; and 3.4% of participants (n =
6) reported other. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 23 with a mean age of 18.8. 53.4% of
participants (n = 93) reported being first year students, 31% of participants (n = 54) reported
being in their sophomore year, 8.6% of participants (n = 15) reported being in their junior year,
and 4.6% of participants (n = 8) reported being in their senior year.
Regarding religious beliefs, 65.9% of participants (n = 112) reported being affiliated with
an organized religion, and 31.1% (n = 53) reported not being affiliated with a religion. In
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addition, 14.7% of participants (n = 25) reported having strong religious commitment 48.2% (n =
82) reported having a moderate level of religious commitment, and 34.7% (n = 59) reported
having no religious commitment.
Measures
Religious Beliefs Measure
Religious beliefs were measured utilizing two self-report items that were embedded in
the background questionnaire. The first item asked participants to self-identify their religious
affiliation (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Atheist, Agnostic, or Other). The second item
examined level of religious commitment on a 5-point scale (1 = No Commitment, 2 = Some
Commitment, 3 = Moderate Commitment, 4 = Strong Commitment, and 5 = Extremely Devout).
The Religiosity variable was computed utilizing data collected in the background
questionnaire on religious affiliation (see Appendix B). We created two groups in the variable:
Religious or Not Religious. The groups were made based off of the assumption that being
affiliated with an organized religion constituted someone as being religious. The Religious group
was composed of participants who were Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, or Other. The Not
Religious group was composed of participants who were Atheist, Agnostic, or None.
The Commitment variable was computed utilizing data collected in the background
questionnaire on religious commitment (see Appendix B). Because there was only one
participant who self-identified as Extremely Devout, and because we decided that Some
Commitment and Moderate Commitment are too similar to differentiate the importance of
having both, we decided to compute three commitment levels from the original five. We
merged the Some Commitment and Moderate Commitment groups into a single Some
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Commitment group, and we merged the Strong Commitment and Extremely Devout groups into
a single Strong Commitment group, leaving three groups: No Commitment, Some Commitment,
and Strong Commitment.
Free Will Beliefs Measure
Free will beliefs were measured utilizing the Free Will Inventory (FWI), a 29-item
inventory with two parts. Part 1 has three 5-item subscales. Utilizing the first two subscales in
Part 1 of the FWI, the present study explored the strength of participants’ beliefs in free will
and determinism (see Table 1). Part 2 has 14 items that examine more complex beliefs about
free will and determinism. The present study looked specifically at items 1, 3, 4, and 13 to
examine participants beliefs in libertarianism and compatibilism (see Table 2).
The Free Will (FW) and Determinism (Det) variables were computed utilizing data
collected from Part 1 of the FWI (see Table 1). The FW variable was composed of the Free Will
Subscale (items 1, 4, 7, 10, and 13 in Table 1), with a range between 5 and 35, higher scores
indicating stronger endorsement of the concept of free will. The Det variable was composed of
the Determinism Subscale (items 2, 5, 8, 11, and 14 in Table 1), with a range between 5 and 35,
with higher scores indicating stronger endorsement of determinism. Both of these subscales
are defined in “The Free Will Inventory: Measuring Beliefs about Agency and Responsibility”
(Nadelhoffer et al., 2014).
The Libertarianism and Compatibilism variables were computed using data collected
from Part 2 of the FWI (see Table 2). The Libertarianism variable was composed of items 4 and
6, with a range between 2 and 14, with higher scores suggesting a stronger endorsement of
libertarianism. The Compatibilism variable was composed of items 3 and 13, with a range
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between 2 and 14, with higher scores indicating a stronger endorsement of compatibilism (see
Table 2).
Procedure
Participants were recruited through LMU Psychology Department’s Human Subject Pool.
All students in the Subject Pool were registered for a General Psychology course at LMU, and
students volunteered for studies in order to receive credit for participating in psychology
studies for their General Psychology course. The study was administered online through
Qualtrics, a web-based tool that enables researchers to perform survey research and collect
data. Participants first completed an informed consent form (see Appendix A). They then
completed a background questionnaire (see Appendix B) followed by the FWI (see Table 1 and
Table 2).
Results
Level of significance (or alpha level) for all statistical tests was set at p = .05.
Analyses of Variance
To examine the possible association between religiosity and beliefs about free will,
determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism, four one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA)
were conducted with the quasi-independent variable of religiosity, which has two groups:
religious or not religious. Means, standard deviations, probability values, measures of effect
size (Partial Eta Squared), and F-ratios for this series of ANOVAs are presented in Table 3.
A similar series of ANOVAs were conducted on our secondary hypotheses, which
examined how level of religious commitment may relate to or impact people’s beliefs about
free will, determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Again, four ANOVAS were performed
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on the quasi-independent variable of religious commitment including three groups: strong,
moderate, and none. All means, standard deviations, probability values, measures of effect size
(Partial Eta Squared), and F-ratios are presented in Table 4.
Correlational Analysis
Three Pearson Product Moment Correlational analyses were used to explore the
relationships between endorsement of free will, endorsement of determinism, and
endorsement of compatibilism.
The correlational analysis was statistically significant in a positive direction between the
strength of one’s endorsement of free will and the strength of one’s endorsement of
compatibilism (see Table 5), which suggests that those who have stronger endorsements of free
will are more likely to endorse compatibilism than those who have weaker endorsements of
free will (see Figure 1).
The correlational analysis’s results indicated that there is a statistically significant
negative correlation between the strength of one’s endorsement of determinism and the
strength of one’s endorsement of compatibilism, (see Table 5; see Figure 2). This suggests that
those who have stronger endorsements of determinism are less likely to endorse compatibilism
than those who have weaker endorsements of determinism.
The third correlational analysis’s results indicated that there is no correlation between
free will and determinism (see Table 5), suggesting that one’s endorsement of free will has no
relation to their endorsement of determinism (see Figure 3).
Discussion
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Recall that there were originally four primary hypotheses and four secondary
hypotheses:
1. People who are religious are more likely to have stronger free will beliefs than those
who do not affiliate with a religion.
1.1 Secondary Hypothesis: People who self-identify as having strong religious
commitment are more likely to have stronger free will beliefs than those who
self-identify as having weaker religious commitment.
2. People who are religious are more likely to have weaker beliefs in determinism than
those who do not affiliate with a religion.
2.1 Secondary Hypothesis: People who self-identify as having strong religious
commitment are more likely to have weaker beliefs in determinism than
those who self-identify as having weaker religious commitment.
3. People who are religious are more likely to endorse libertarianism than those who
do not affiliate with religion.
3.1 Secondary Hypothesis: People who self-identify as having strong religious
commitment are more likely to endorse libertarianism than those who selfidentify as having weaker religious commitment.
4. People who are religious are less likely to endorse compatibilism than those who do
not affiliate with religion.
4.1 Secondary Hypothesis: People who self-identify as having strong religious
commitment are less likely to endorse compatibilism than those who selfidentify as having weaker religious commitment.
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Primary hypothesis 1—people who are religious are more likely to have stronger free
will beliefs than those who do not have any religious affiliation—and its secondary hypothesis
1.1 are notably related to endorsement of free will. We found a trend supporting this primary
hypothesis (p = .069). Mean scores on the FWI did suggest that those who are religious have
stronger free will beliefs than those who are not religious. However, although close, this
difference was not statistically significant. In addition, we found no statistically significant
difference in means between level of religious commitment and one’s strength of beliefs in free
will.
That said, with regards to this secondary hypothesis—people who self-identify as having
strong religious commitment are more likely to have stronger free will beliefs than those who
self-identify as having weaker religious commitment— looking at the mean scores in Table 3,
the pattern shows an incremental increase in free will belief as religious commitment goes up.
Both the patterns being shown in primary hypothesis 1 and its secondary hypothesis align with
previous research showing a positive association between levels of religiosity and strength of
belief in free will—as level of religious commitment increases, strength of belief in free will
increases (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). It is possible that we did not find a statistically significant
difference because of low statistical power. In Carey & Paulhus’s study, their correlation was r =
.13, which, while statistically significant, is a small correlation. In their study, the sample size
was large (N = 253). Because this was such a small effect, the large sample size enabled Carey &
Paulhus to find a statistically significant result. In addition, in Carey & Paulhus’s study, if we
square their r to find effect size, we get r2 = .017. In our study, we found the same effect size (η2
= .017). This, in addition to the fact that our sample size was smaller (N = 170) than Carey &
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Paulhus’s study shows that we are likely under-powered, and more participants are likely
needed to find a statistically significant result.
Our 2nd primary hypothesis (people who are religious are more likely to have weaker
beliefs in determinism than those who do not affiliate with a religion) was not supported by our
study. Instead, a statistically significant difference in means indicated that those who are
religious have higher endorsement of determinism than those who are not religious. This
finding does not fully align with previous research. When it comes to research on religiosity as it
relates to determinism, reported results are complicated but suggest that there is a negative
correlation between religiosity and determinism—increased religiosity associates with lower
endorsement of determinism—although different definitions of determinism impact this
association (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). For instance, when looking at fatalistic determinism, Carey
& Paulhus found a statistically significant small positive correlation (r = .24) between religiosity
and belief in fatalistic determinism—as religiosity increases, belief in fatalistic determinism
increases. However, when it came to scientific determinism, Carey & Paulhus found no
statistically significant correlation between religiosity and belief in scientific determinism. This
relationship regarding different definitions and understandings of determinism will be further
discussed below.
With regards to the secondary hypothesis here, namely that people who self-identify as
having strong religious commitment are more likely to have weaker beliefs in determinism than
those who self-identify as having weaker religious commitment, we found no statistically
significant difference between level of religious commitment and one’s strength of beliefs in
determinism. In addition, looking at Table 3, we found no pattern suggesting any impact of level
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of religious commitment on strength of endorsement of determinism. Because in previous
research, there appears to often be some kind relationship between religious commitment and
belief in determinism, it is possible that this, again, is due to our study being under-powered
(Carey & Paulhus, 2011; Caspar, Verdin, Rigoni, Cleeremans, & Klein, 2017). However, because
we don’t see a pattern, it is difficult to assess whether or not this is true. In addition, because
the FWI is actually interested in causal determinism, whereas Carey & Paulhus (2011) and
Caspar et al. (2017) examined scientific determinism and fatalism, perhaps we just see that
level of religious commitment has little or no association to belief in causal determinism.
We also did not find evidence supporting our 3rd primary hypothesis, which stated that
people who are religious are more likely to endorse libertarianism than those who do not
associate with some religion. Rather, a statistically significant difference showed the opposite:
those who are not religious have higher endorsement of libertarianism than those who are
religious. We believe that this finding aligns with our finding that religious people have higher
endorsement of determinism than those who are not religious. If religious people are more
likely to endorse determinism than non-religious people, it makes logical sense that they would
then have weaker endorsement of libertarianism, or the belief that people have free will and
determinism does not exist. With reference to our 3rd secondary hypothesis (people who selfidentify as having strong religious commitment are more likely to endorse libertarianism than
those who self-identify as having weaker religious commitment), we found no statistically
significant difference between level of religious commitment and endorsement of
libertarianism. In addition, we see no patterns, and therefore see no reason to believe that
level of religious commitment has an impact on strength of beliefs in libertarianism. Rather, we
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think that only religiosity (whether or not one is affiliated with a religion) relates to the strength
of one’s endorsement of libertarianism.
Our final primary hypothesis was that people who are religious are less likely to endorse
compatibilism than those who are not affiliated with a religion. Regarding this hypothesis,
evidence did not show any support. We found no statistically significant difference in
endorsement of compatibilism between those who are and those who are not religious.
However, we see a very small, not statistically significant, pattern suggesting that it is possible
that those who are religious have higher endorsement of compatibilism than those who are not
religious (see Table 4). In addition, regarding our final secondary hypothesis—people who selfidentify as having strong religious commitment are less likely to endorse compatibilism than
those who self-identify as having weaker religious commitment—we found no statistically
significant difference in belief of compatibilism between different levels of religious
commitment. But, again, looking at Table 3, there is small, non-statistically significant pattern
hinting that it is plausible that those with higher religious commitment have higher
endorsement of compatibilism than those with lower religious commitment. Both of the
patterns found in these primary and secondary hypotheses align with our results relating to our
first and second primary hypotheses: if religious people have higher endorsement of free will
and higher endorsement of determinism than those who are not religious, it follows that
religious people would have higher endorsement of compatibilism, or the belief that free will
and determinism can exist together.
Before making interpretations or drawing any conclusions about our results, we want to
discuss possible limitations of our study. For instance, the fact that the effect sizes found for

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS THEY RELATE TO BELIEFS ABOUT FREE WILL

17

each statistical analysis (see Table 3 and Table 4) were very low suggests that these topics
might be too nuanced to find statistically significant differences. Therefore, detecting a true
effect in these nuanced philosophical topics might be less likely. In addition, because the study
was run through the LMU Psychology Department’s Human Subject Pool, all of the participants
are undergraduate students at a Jesuit, Catholic university all taking a general psychology
course. Our study looks at religious beliefs, but since LMU students are all in a Jesuit curriculum,
it is likely that some of these beliefs are influenced by this curriculum. In addition, it is possible
that there are some nuances in how such students taking similar courses may think as
compared to the general population, so we want to be careful of over-generalizing our results.
However, we do believe that our results suggest something interesting about the
association between religious beliefs and nuanced beliefs about free will. Our results suggest
that religious people are more likely to endorse free will and determinism as compared to those
who are not religious. In accordance with this, religious people are less likely to endorse
libertarianism—the idea that humans have free will and are not determined by external factors
(McKenna & Pereboom, 2016). And, we found a possible pattern indicating that religious
people are more likely to endorse compatibilism than those who are not religious. These
findings are interesting when compared to both general folk intuitions about free will and folk
understanding of free will as it relates to religious teachings.
Folk Understanding of Free Will, and Determinism, and Religion
Philosophers often consider non-philosophers’ intuitions about free will and
determinism, and it is understood that non-philosophers often have a premonition that free
will is not compatible with determinism. In other words, some philosophers believe that those
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who are not philosophers often begin as incompatibilists and believe that there is some innate
conflict between free will and determinism (Kane, 1999). If this is true, our results that religious
people are more likely to endorse both free will and determinism may appear confusing.
However, more in line with our results, there are findings that contradict this idea that people
are, at first, incompatibilists. For instance, previous research has found statistically significant
results showing that, even with an understanding that there is a deterministic universe,
participants still responded that some person has free will (Nahmias, 2011). These results
motivate us to understand our results not as confusing but rather possibly common among a
general population.
In addition to such intuitions non-philosophers have about free will and determinism,
people might assume that the fact that religious people are more likely to endorse both free
will and determinism than non-religious people is illogical.
In common theism God is understood to be omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and
omniscient (Speak, 2014). Put simply, God is then all-powerful, good, and all-knowing. I will
focus here on this idea of omniscience. An omniscient being is understood to be a being that is
all-knowing and one that holds no false beliefs, and therefore, if God is omniscient (as theists
understand God to be), nothing God believes can be false. (Pike, 1965). In addition, God being
omniscient means that God knows everything–past, present, and future. Therefore, we can look
at the following example. Let’s say a woman has a choice to either go to the grocery store or
not go to the grocery store. If this woman has free will, it is within her complete power to
choose to go to the grocery store or stay home. However, God, being an omniscient being,
must have held, at any time in the past, a belief about whether the woman would choose to go
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to the grocery store. Since God can have no false beliefs, the woman’s choice had to have been
the choice God believed she would make. This example shows a possible incompatibility
between God’s omniscience and the existence of freedom of will within theistic teachings
(Basinger, 1984). This helps to show why the idea that religious people would be more likely to
endorse both free will and determinism might, at first glance, seem illogical.
Religious Teachings and Free Will
Before we take a deeper look into how we may be able to use this idea of God’s
omniscience to actually motivate our findings, we must take a look more deeply at religious
teachings regarding free will. There is a lack of consistent teachings on free will and
determinism among common Abrahamic religions, namely Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. This
inconsistency could, on its own, possibly explain our study’s findings.
Now, first let’s take a look at the fact that those who are religious appear to be more
likely to have higher endorsement free will than those who are not religious. Depending on
what religion we are looking at, we will find different teachings regarding free will. However, in
Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism we find that people are taught to believe that there is
free will. Jewish teachings often state that free will is “bestowed” upon all humans (Nadler,
2019). In the Jewish faith, people believe that freedom of will is the only way that moral
responsibility can be preserved, and Jewish people do believe that moral responsibility has
been preserved (Nadler, 2019). In terms of Christianity, we see conflicting teachings on
freedom of the will. However, many common Protestant denominations endorse free will. For
instance, the founder of Methodism, John Wesley, rejects any kind of predestination or
determinism (Cary, 2007). Catholicism also argues for a strong doctrine of free will (Cary, 2007;
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Glaeser & Glendon, 1998). These religious teachings may explain why we see in our study that
religious people are possibly more likely to have stronger endorsement of free will than nonreligious people.
Religious Teachings and Determinism
Contrary to religious teachings that argue for the existence of free will, other religious
teachings argue for the existence of predestination, fatalism, or divine determinism.
Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Islam all have religious teachings that endorse a deterministic type
of universe. In Luther’s teachings, he believes that humans are incapable of making good
choices by their own will; he accepts that, therefore, it is not up to humans to be able to make
choices (Cary, 2007; Luther & Cole, 1823). Calvinist teachings are very similar to Lutheran
teachings—they accept predestination by God rather than free will (Cary, 2007). In Islam (and
Eastern religions in general), teachings often emphasize divine dominion and predestination,
hinting more at the existence of determinism than the existence of free will (Watt, 1982). These
religious teachings may explain the fact that in our study we found that religious people are
more likely to have higher endorsement of determinism than those who are not religious.
But what type of determinism is it that religious people are likely to endorse? There are
many different definitions of determinism. In this discussion, we will discuss the general
definition of causal determinism and divine determinism (also referred to as theological
determinism and fatalism). Because our study utilized the Free Will Inventory, we look at the
following definition of determinism: the idea that given the past and the laws of nature, there is
only one possible future (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014). This definition is a general definition of
causal determinism. It is the idea that given the way things were in the past, the events in the
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future must be fixed by natural law (Hoefer, 2003). However, this definition is notably general
and could be interpreted in different ways. Therefore, it is possible that the reason we found
that religious people are more likely to endorse determinism that non-religious people is
because they interpreted this causal determinism as a type of divine determinism.
Divine determinism includes many things. First, it is the idea that God causally
determines everything (McKenna & Pereboom, 2016). It is also the understanding that this
determinism arises from God’s exertion of power (Hunt, 2002). In addition, divine determinism
is the idea that every event is necessitated and caused by God’s will (Vicens, 2012). Each of
these definitions of divine determinism can easily go along with the general definition of
determinism utilized in the Free Will Inventory—given the past, God determines all future
events. Especially if some religious teachings point to the existence of determinism, and all
religions tend to accept that God is all-knowing, it follows that religious people might interpret
causal determinism as divine determinism. Therefore, they might be more likely to have
stronger beliefs in determinism than those who are not religious.
Omniscience and Compatibilism
So far, we have been looking at the fact that we found that people who are religious are
more likely to have higher endorsement of both free will and determinism as compared to nonreligious people. It is possible that this is true without suggesting that religious people actually
endorse the idea that both exist together. But recall that we also saw a very slight trend
showing that it is possible that those who are religious are more likely to also have higher
endorsement of compatibilism than non-religious people. This would be the idea that religious
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people have higher endorsement of the idea that free will and determinism exist together in
our universe. To motivate this possible result, we must return to the idea of omniscience.
Remember that in common theism, God is omniscient. This belief is true even in those
religions that teach that free will exists and determinism does not exist. Therefore, we think
that even if religions like Judaism, Methodism, and Catholicism say that there is no
determinism, they still endorse the fact that God is all-knowing and has no false beliefs. These
seem to be contradictory endorsements. This contradiction, and folk inability to reconcile such
a contradiction, might in itself explain our results (Watt, 1982). Perhaps some religious people
have been taught that free will exists, and therefore, they have higher endorsement of free will
than non-religious people. In addition, because religious people are also taught to believe in an
omniscient God, they tend to have some inkling towards accepting that determinism exists in
addition to free will.
Discussion of Exploratory Analyses
In addition to the results discussed above, we want to discuss our exploratory analyses.
Recall that we performed three Pearson Product Moment Correlations as a part of an
exploratory analysis in our study: (1) the association between strength of endorsement of free
will and strength of endorsement in compatibilism, (2) the association between strength of
endorsement of determinism and strength of endorsement in compatibilism, and (3) the
association between strength of endorsement of free will and strength of endorsement in
determinism.
We found that there was a small positive correlation between strength of belief in free
will and strength of belief in compatibilism (see Table 5), meaning that as strength of belief in
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free will increases, strength of belief in compatibilism also increases. When we look at the
demographics of the present study’s participants, we see that the majority of participants
reported being affiliated with an organized religion (65.9%), and the majority of participants
reported having moderate or strong religious commitment (62.9%). If we look at the trend we
found showing that those who are religious have higher endorsement of free will, and if most
of the participants in the present study are religious, it makes sense that we would see a
positive correlation between free will beliefs and compatibilism beliefs based on our discussion
above about religious teachings on free will and determinism. If religious people accept the
idea that God is omniscient and if they endorse free will, they may be likely to also endorse
determinism, and therefore, endorse compatibilism. Accepting this possibility and noting that
the majority of our participants are in some way or another religious, points to the idea that
those who then endorsed free will in our study may also be more likely to have stronger
endorsement of compatibilism.
In addition, we found that there was a small negative correlation between strength of
belief in determinism and strength of belief in compatibilism (see Table 5), meaning that as
strength of belief in determinism increases, strength of belief in compatibilism decreases and
vice versa. Again, because most of our participants are religious, we can point to religious
teachings to possibly explain why this correlation might exist. Because in common theism God
is understood to be omniscient, it is easy to see how religious people might endorse
determinism. In addition, because there are quite a few religions in which people are taught
that free will does not exist, it is possible that this could influence participants not to endorse
compatibilism.
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Regarding our last exploratory correlational analysis, we found a very slight correlational
trend in a negative direction (as strength of belief in free will increases, strength of belief in
determinism decreases). However, the correlation was slight and was not statistically significant
(see Table 5). Therefore, we are inclined to think there is no true correlational relationship
between free will and determinism. In some ways, this does not seem to follow folk
understanding of free will and determinism. Intuitively, non-philosophers might expect free will
and determinism to be negatively correlated. However, the fact that this does not appear to
truly be the case parallels all of our other results. Again, we found that those who have some
religious affiliation are possibly more likely to believe in free will, appear to be more likely to
believe in determinism, and seem to be less likely to believe in libertarianism that those who
are not affiliated with a religion. Considering that most of our participants do affiliate with
some organized religion, it would be less likely that we would find such a negative correlation
(or any correlation) between free will and determinism. If our participants are less likely to be
libertarians, and they believe in free will, they are not incompatibilists. Therefore, there would
not be any strong negative correlation between free will and determinism. Because we do not
see a strong trend showing that those who are religious are more likely to, overall, have
stronger beliefs in compatibilism than those who are not religious, it also makes sense that we
do not see a positive correlation between free will and determinism.
Conclusion
In analyzing our results, we found that religious affiliation and level of religious
commitment may have some relation to strength of beliefs in free will, determinism,
libertarianism, and compatibilism. It appears that those with some religious affiliation are more
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likely to have stronger endorsement both free will and determinism than those who have no
religious affiliation. It seems to make intuitive sense that those who are religious are more likely
to endorse free will than non-religious people. However, although it may be surprising that
religious people have stronger endorsement of determinism than those who are not religious,
we believe that this could be due to the fact that religious people have a tendency to believe in
God’s omniscience. Therefore, it is possible that those who are affiliated with some organized
religion understand causal determinism to be divine determinism and endorse the idea that
God’s will causes the future.
Future Research
Our study gives some insight into how our beliefs about religion can be related to and
potentially impact beliefs about other topics. However, we only looked at people’s beliefs
about free will, and therefore, future research could be done to evaluate what other topics of
belief might be related to religious beliefs.
In addition, we might be interested in how other types of beliefs relate to the strength
of belief in free will. For example, how might one’s political beliefs be associated with their
endorsement of free will? How might one’s nationality relate to their beliefs about free will?
We also believe that future research in the area of religious beliefs and free will should
examine ethical considerations of both religious beliefs and the belief in free will. For instance,
we want to understand how one’s belief or disbelief in free will may be related to their ethical
considerations and vice versa. In addition, it may be interesting to consider how religious
traditions’ ethical teachings might be related to beliefs about free will.
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Our results thus far appear to shine light on relationships between religious
endorsement and beliefs about free will, determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism, and
further examination of research in these areas may allow us to better understand how people’s
different sets of beliefs might be significantly interconnected.
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Table 1
Free Will Inventory Part 1 Items
#

Statements

1

People always have the ability to do otherwise.

2

Everything that has ever happened had to happen precisely as it did, given what happened before.

3

The fact that we have souls that are distinct from our material bodies is what makes humans unique.

4

People always have free will.

5

Every event that has ever occurred, including human decisions and actions, was completely determined
by prior events.

6

Human action can only be understood in terms of our souls and minds and not just in terms of our
brains.

7

How people’s lives unfold is completely up to them.

8

People’s choices and actions must happen precisely the way they do because of the laws of nature and
the way things were in the distant past.

9

Each person has a non-physical essence that makes that person unique.

10

People ultimately have complete control over their decisions and their actions.

11

A supercomputer that could know everything about the way the universe is now could know everything
about the way the universe will be in the future.

12

The human mind cannot simply be reduced to the brain.

13

People have free will even when their choices are completely limited by external circumstances.

14

Given the way things were at the Big Bang, there is only one way for everything to happen in the
universe after that.

15

The human mind is more than just a complicated biological machine.

Note.

Items 1, 4, 7, 10, and 13 make up the Free Will (FW) Subscale; and items 2, 5, 8, 11, and 14 make up the
Determinism (DE) Subscale.
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Table 2
Free Will Inventory Part 2 Items
#

Statements

1

Free will is the ability to make different choices even if everything leading up to one’s choice (e.g., the
past, the situation, and their desires, beliefs, etc.) were exactly the same.

2

Free will is the ability to make a choice based on one’s beliefs and desires such that, if one had different
beliefs or desires, one’s choice would have been different as well

3

People could have free will even if scientists discovered all of the laws that govern all human behavior

4

To have free will means that a person’s decisions and actions could not be perfectly predicted by
someone else no matter how much information they had

5

If it turned out that people lacked non-physical (or immaterial) souls, then they would lack free will

6

To have free will is to be able to cause things to happen in the world without at the same time being
caused to make those things happen

7

People have free will as long as they are able to do what they want without being coerced or
constrained by other people

8

To be responsible for our present decisions and actions we must also be responsible for all of our prior
decisions and actions that led up to the present moment

9

People deserve to be blamed and punished for bad actions only if they acted of their own free will

10

People who harm others deserve to be punished even if punishing them will not produce any positive
benefits to either the offender or society—e.g., rehabilitation, deterring other would-be offenders, etc.

11

People who perform harmful actions ought to be rehabilitated so they no longer pose a threat to
society

12

People who perform harmful actions ought to be punished so that other potential offenders are
deterred from committing similar harmful actions

13

People could be morally responsible even if scientists discovered all of the laws that govern human
behavior

14

If it turned out that people lacked non-physical (or immaterial) souls, then they would lack moral
responsibility

Note.

Items 4 and 6 suggest a belief in libertarianism. Items 3 and 13 suggest a belief in compatibilism.
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Table 3
One Way Analysis of Variance Results with Religiosity as the Quasi-Independent Factor
Religious

Not Religious

M

SD

M

SD

F

p

η2

Free Will

25.08

5.17

23.52

5.10

3.35

.069

.020

Determinism

18.53

4.89

16.58

5.67

5.10

.025

.030

Libertarianism

9.30

1.93

10.11

1.90

6.42

.012

.038

Compatibilism

10.43

1.99

10.17

2.15

0.58

.448

.004
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Table 4
One Way Analysis of Variance Results with Religious Commitment as the Quasi-Independent Factor
Strong Commitment

Moderate Commitment

No Commitment

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

p

η2

Free Will

25.84

4.94

24.72

5.05

23.85

5.39

1.37

.257

.017

Determinism

17.76

5.13

18.40

4.84

17.39

5.80

0.66

.519

.008

Libertarianism

9.36

1.95

9.43

1.97

9.85

1.90

0.97

.381

.012

Compatibilism

10.84

1.95

10.35

2.01

10.12

2.09

1.11

.332

.013
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Table 5
Pearson Correlations between Belief in Free Will vs. Belief in Compatibilism, Belief in
Determinism vs. Belief in Compatibilism, and Belief in Free Will vs. Belief in Determinism
Free Will
Free Will

—

Determinism

Compatibilism

-.008(.918)

.253(.001)

Determinism

-.008(.918)

—

-.289(.000)

Compatibilism

.253(.001)

-.289(.000)

—

Note. p values are in parentheses next to r values.
Alpha level set at α < .05.
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Figure 1
Pearson Correlation between Free Will and Compatibilism
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Figure 2
Pearson Correlation between Determinism and Compatibilism
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Figure 3
Pearson Correlation between Free Will and Determinism
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Appendix A
Informed Consent Form
Loyola Marymount University
Informed Consent Form
TITLE: Religious Commitment and Free Will
INVESTIGATOR: Leigh Lewis, Psychology Department, Loyola Marymount University
ADVISOR: Dr. David Hardy, Ph.D., Psychology Department, Loyola Marymount University
PURPOSE: You are being asked to participate in a research project that seeks to investigate how
a person’s religious commitment is related to his/her/their free will beliefs. You will be asked to
complete a brief demographic questionnaire, to self-identify your level of religious
commitment, and complete a survey on your beliefs about free will. You will not be audio or
videotaped. The survey will take less than one hour.
RISKS: Risks associated with this study include: NONE
BENEFITS: Furthering understanding of how religious commitment might be related to beliefs
about free will.
INCENTIVES: Participation will satisfy partial course requirements for General Psychology.
CONFIDENTIALITY: No personal or demographic information about you will be collected.
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW: Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw your
consent to participate at any time without penalty. Your withdrawal will not influence any other
services to which you may be otherwise entitled, your class standing or relationship with Loyola
Marymount University.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS: A summary of the results of this research will be supplied to you, at no
cost, upon request, approximately one month after completion of the study, by contacting the
primary investigator, Leigh Lewis, at llewis25@lion.lmu.edu.
VOLUNTARY CONSENT: I have read the above statements and understand what is being asked
of me. I also understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my
consent at any time, for any reason, without penalty. If the study design or use of the
information is changed, I will be informed and my consent reobtained. On these terms, I certify
that I am willing to participate in this research project.
I understand that if I have any further questions, comments or concerns about the study or the
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informed consent process, I may contact Dr. David Moffet, Chair, Institutional Review Board,
Loyola Marymount University, 1 LMU Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90045-2659 or by email at
David.Moffet@lmu.edu.
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Appendix B
Background Questionnaire
1. Please type your age (in years): _____
2. Select the choice that best represents your sex: o Female o Male o Other
3. Select the choice that best represents your ethnicity:
o Asian or Asian American
o Black or African American
o Hispanic or Latino
o Native American or Pacific Islander or Alaskan Native
o White or European American
o Other (please describe or explain):
4. What is your major(s)? ____
______________________
5. Please select your class standing: o First Year o Sophomore o Junior o Senior
6. Please select the option that best describes your religious orientation / affiliation:
o Christian
o Muslim
o Jewish
o Hindu
o Atheist
o Agnostic
o Other (please describe or explain): _____
o None
Please select the choice that best represents your degree of religious commitment:
o 1 no commitment
o 2 some commitment
o 3 moderate commitment
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o 4 strong commitment
o 5 extremely devout
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